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Abstract—A hook is a piece of code. It checks user privacy
policy before some sensitive operations happen. We propose
an automated solution named Prihook for hook placement in
the Android Framework. Addressing specific context-aware user
privacy concerns, the hook placement in Prihook is personalized.
Specifically, we design User Privacy Preference Table (UPPT)
to help a user express his privacy concerns. And we leverage
machine learning to discover a Potential Method Set (consisting
of Sensor Data Access Methods and Sensor Control Methods)
from which we can select a particular subset to put hooks. We
propose a mapping from words in the UPPT lexicon to methods
in the Potential Method Set. With this mapping, Prihook is able
to (a) select a specific set of methods; and (b) generate and place
hooks automatically. We test Prihook separately on 6 typical
UPPTs representing 6 kinds of resource-sensitive UPPTs, and no
user privacy violation is found. The experimental results show
that the hooks placed by PriHook have small runtime overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
A typical smartphone usually employs a spectrum of
sensors. These sensors are able to provide information
about location, sounds, images in a user surrounding en-
vironment. At the OS level, these sensors are shared re-
sources that can be used by different applications. User
apps are often able to access sensor resources through sys-
tem services (e.g., SensorService, CameraService).
For example, a car-hailing app (e.g., Uber) can call
LocationManagerService to obtain a user’s GPS and
then use it to search the available taxies nearby.
Several studies have already shown that if the above re-
sources are involved in a user privacy concern, a user app
may leak sensitive personal data through abusing involved
sensor resource [1]–[7]. A privacy concern can be viewed as
a combination of a resource, a particular context in which
the resource is accessed, and a policy about how to deal
with the accesses. A context can be represented by a set of
information items like time, date, location, system status. For
example, when a user is in a private meeting context (e.g.,
a private business negotiation in Hotel X at 9 a.m.), he is
always concerned about his conversation and physical location
and may expect to disable GPS, camera and microphone.
So in this case, his privacy concern involves the particular
resources (i.e., GPS, microphone and camera), the particular
policy (i.e., disable GPS, camera and microphone) and the
particular context (i.e., the system time of smartphone is 9 a.m.
and the GPS position is Hotel X). Further, different users may
have different privacy concerns and adopt different privacy
policies. Accordingly, no universally applicable policy really
exists to meet the privacy protection needs of all users.
To address the individual privacy concerns, on Android
smartphones, the existing permission mechanism allows a
user to accept or deny permissions on sensitive resources
(e.g., camera, microphone) at app installation time or at
runtime. However, researchers still try to place hooks into
the Android Framework (i.e., system services) for privacy
protection due to the following reasons: First, the existing
Android permission mechanism provides an unlimited use
of user-approved permissions for apps once installed. When
a resource is accessed, there is no context-aware check in
the standard Android Framework. However, prior studies [8],
[9] have shown that users often change their perceptions
about what permissions should be approved to an app when
apprised of the various sensitive contexts. Hence, comparing
the existing one-time permission granting, it requires access
restrictions based on user privacy concerns at runtime. Second,
resources are directly accessed by methods in the Framework.
If we want to conduct context-aware checks, placing hooks
before these access methods is a straightforward way.
Listing 1 shows a method with a hook in ipShield [10].
This method is sensitive because it may send GPS data to
a user app. ipShield adds a hook in it to protect GPS data.
When a user app calls this method, the hook will check the
context-aware privacy policy for the app and decide whether
this method can or cannot access the current GPS resource
(Line 7). If the access is disallowed, it will ignore the request
and start checking the access request of the next app in the
queue (Line 11). Otherwise, it does nothing but prints a log
entry (Line 8). Before data is actually sent to a user app,
ipShield checks the policy again to control the data granularity
(e.g., how big the location radius should be) using a designated
form of data transformation (Line 13). Therefore, a hook is
a piece of code. It checks user privacy policy before some
sensitive operations happen.
Listing 1: A method with a hook in the real world
1 private void handleLocationChangedLocked(Location location ,
boolean passive ) {
2 // some existing code in handleLocationChangedLocked
3 // The code from line 4 to line 14 is a hook.
4 for (UpdateRecord r : records ) {
5 RuleKey ruleKey = new RuleKey(TYPE GPS, receiver.mUid,
receiver.mPackageName);
6 Rule rule = mPrivacyRules.get (ruleKey) ;
7 if (mSensorPerturb. isActionPlayback ( rule ) ) {
8 Log.d(TAG, ”Sending Playback location to ” + receiver .
mPackageName);
9 } else {
10 Log.d(TAG, ”Not sending Playback location to ” + receiver .
mPackageName);
11 continue ;
12 }
13 notifyLocation = mSensorPerturb.transformData ( notifyLocation , rule
) ;
14 } // end of a hook
15 // The rest of this method sends GPS data to a user app.
16 }
Some existing works [11], [12] start from permission-checks
to place hooks. However, our key observation is that although
the code in the Android Framework can check whether a
user app has permission to use some resources, it often
checks permission at the beginning of requesting a resource
(such as new an object or a thread). Once it grants that
permission to an app, there will be no check during use of
that resource. If we only add hooks in permission-checks,
which means no context-aware check exists during use, privacy
violation may happen. For instance, permission-checks can
decide whether an app has permission to record audio through
microphone at the beginning of opening a record. However,
during recording, there is no permission check in the existing
Android Framework. Hence, no context-aware check will be
enforced because we only add hooks in permission-checks.
Once the context has changed after recording for a while,
privacy violation can happen because the changed context
may not allow recording any more. Hence, placing hooks in
permission-checks is not a good choice for privacy protection.
Meanwhile, onboard sensors are zero-permissioned. Methods
related to them do not involve any permission check. Someone
who uses permission-checks as a clue for hook placement will
omit these methods.
Although several efforts have attempted to place hooks in
the Android Framework, these efforts have been beset with
some typical mistakes. Table I shows some hook mistakes in
the existing context-aware solutions. The definition of mistakes
will be discussed shortly in Section III.
Problem Statement. How to automate the placement of
context-aware hooks in the Android Framework based on
specific context-aware user privacy concerns and avoid the
three mistakes (i.e., the bypass, the no-isolation, the useless)?
The main goal of this paper is to provide an automated,
personalized and scalable solution named Prihook for hook
placement in the Android Framework. Because an expert
cannot ensure that the attacker will never be able to find
a creative way to bypass the deployed hooks and violate
the privacy policy, our solution does not guarantee it either.
We implement and evaluate Prihook based on 3 key ideas.
First, before placing hooks, we should systematically inspect
the Android Framework code and discover a potential set of
methods from which we can select a particular subset to put
hooks (K1). One main contribution of this work is that we
TABLE I: Hook mistakes in the existing context-aware privacy
protections
Context-aware privacy protections Hook mistakes
ipShield [10] bypass
Semadroid [13] no-isolation
Viola [14]&Aurasium [15]&AppOp [16] useless
Protect My Privacy (PMP) [17] bypass, no-isolation
search and analyze the whole Android Framework to provide
the Potential Method Set (PMS). This set consists of two kinds
of methods: Sensor Data Access Method (SDAM) and Sensor
Control Method (SCM) (see Section IV). Second, we need to
design user-friendly interface to help a user express privacy
concerns clearly (K2). Third, the hook placement should be
automated and personalized based on specific context-aware
user privacy concerns (K3).
Challenges. To implement these three ideas, we are facing
three main challenges. First, considering the large code base
of the Android Framework, manual inspection of the code
is often impractical. How can we automatically and scalably
discover a potential set of methods that are appropriate for
the hook placement (C1)? One may want to use taint tracking
or static analysis techniques to discover all privacy-relevant
methods. However, we found that existing taint analysis or
static analysis techniques/tools fall short of addressing this
challenge. In Section V-G, we will give a new insight on
why taint tracking or static analysis techniques fail to dis-
cover SDAMs and SCMs. Second, most mobile users lack
professional knowledge about security and each one’s privacy
concerns may be different. How can we design an interface
which is simple and efficient to describe hundreds of millions
of users’ context-aware privacy concerns (C2)? Third, how
can we design an efficient approach to identify the specific set
of SDAMs and SCMs when a specific user privacy concern
(including resources, context and policies) is defined (C3)?
To address Challenge C1, we leverage machine learning
(i.e., support vector machines in our case) to discover the
Potential Method Set. To address Challenge C2, based on two
principles (i.e., good coverage and easy to use), we design
a table named User Privacy Preference Table (UPPT) and
implement it in a portal app. The app helps a user express his
or her privacy concerns by choosing a bunch of simple words
from a portal UI. Then, based on the user privacy decisions,
a UPPT will be generated for hook placement. To address
Challenge C3, one key observation is that, given a specific
user privacy concern, we often cannot directly select methods
relevant to privacy concerns from the Potential Method Set.
Hence, we build a mapping from words in a UPPT to methods
in the Potential Method Set. With this mapping, Prihook is
able to (a) select a specific set of methods; and (b) generate
and place hooks automatically and personally.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
• We design UPPT which can help a user define his
own privacy concerns (including resources, context, and
policies) easily and efficiently. We introduce a seman-
tic intermediate layer named Operation Abstract Layer
Fig. 1: The sensor dataflow on Android smartphones
(OAL) and propose a mapping from words in the UPPT
lexicon to methods in the Potential Method Set (PMS).
• We implement a hooking tool named PriHook which can
automate the hook placement in the Android Framework.
Based on a specific UPPT, Prihook can select methods
from the PMS, generates and puts hooks for the selected
methods automatically.
• We perform a thorough evaluation of PriHook. We test
it separately on 6 typical UPPTs and no user privacy
violation is found. The experimental results show that the
hooks placed by PriHook have small runtime overhead.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Existing Sensor Dataflow on Android Smartphones
Different sensors have different data paths. We group six
classes of sensors into 3 typical data paths as shown in
Figure 1. Path-F is used by wifi, GPS. Path-N is used by
onboard sensors (e.g., accelerometer and gyroscope), camera
and microphone. Path-S is used by bluetooth.
Typically, all the services in Figure 1 are system ser-
vices, each of which runs as a separate thread within
the system server process and starts at system boot
time. The difference between them is focused on whether
it is a Java thread or a C++ thread. For instance,
LocationManagerService, and WifiService are im-
plemented in Android Java Framework and work as Java
threads. SensorService is implemented as a native ser-
vice and works as a C++ thread. CameraService and
AudioFlinger are special cases. They run as native C++
threads in the MediaServer process.
Apps typically do not communicate with the services
directly. Each service has a corresponding proxy
named Manager such as LocationManager and
SensorManager. Hence, apps can access sensor data
through calling a Manager object’s public methods. Both
apps and the Manager object run in the same process
of a Dalvik (or ART) Virtual Machine. Onboard sensors,
GPS, microphone and wifi are in this case. Camera and
bluetooth are special cases. For instance, a user app can use
a BlueToothAdapter object to request operations such
as discovering or enabling bluetooth.
B. Android Access Control Mechanism
In Android, sensitive resources such as sensor data are
protected by a permission-based access control system. Unlike
Linux, Android system does not employ a single checkpoint as
reference monitor to check all the permissions. The permission
checks spread through the Android Framework code and may
be called when a SDAM or a SCM is invoked. However, not all
access of resources results in a permission check. For instance,
onboard sensors (e.g., proximity sensor, accelerometer) are
zero-permission, which means no permission check exists in
corresponding SDAMs and SCMs.
Google develops SEAndroid by porting SElinux’s type
enforcement (TE) MAC policy to the Android platform [18]. It
enforces mandatory policy on system-level operations between
subjects and objects (e.g., system calls). Processes are often
subjects and files are regarded as objects. Besides, subjects
and objects are labeled with a security context. The subject
label is called a domain, and the object label is called a
type. SEAndroid policies define which domain of subjects can
access which type of objects with a bunch of permissions [19].
III. MOTIVATION
Investigating many solutions [10], [13]–[17], [20]–[22], we
find that three kinds of mistakes may happen when a developer
uses his expertise to put hooks. A key motivation of this work
is that we intend to provide an automated hooking tool to
reduce the chance of making mistakes.
Class A (bypass): Hooks are bypassed by a user
app. For instance, ipShield puts a hook in function
handleLocationChangedLocked to check policy
for a user request of GPS data. However, it omits
getLastLocation. This method can also be used
by a user app to obtain the last location information.
Class B (no-isolation): A hook executes in the memory
of a user app process. For instance, Semadroid [13] puts
hooks in ListnerDelegate to control the accuracy of
onboard sensors’ data that a user app can obtain. However,
the ListnerDelegate is implemented as a component in
a user app. Unlike a hook which runs in a process in system
services or apps, a no-isolation hook is in user apps’ process
and hence are prone to be modified by user apps.
Class C (useless): Placing hooks in the location where
no privacy-relevant resource needs to be protected. This is
a common mistake in security solutions [14], [15], [20]. In
general, a user privacy concern often has its mutability. In the
real world, some sensitive context in the past may not be seen
as personal and private in the future. Hence, hooks do not
follow such change will become useless.
Generally speaking, there is a complete method set which
covers all paths to sensitive resources in the Android Frame-
work. And we can hook every method in it to protect user
privacy. Then for different smartphone owner, where to put
hooks is unified although what is done in each hook is not.
However, for a particular smartphone owner, such a naive
solution contains too many hooks than it actually needs. This
is because hooks are placed based on the whole human being’s
privacy concerns rather than that particular owner’s. Too many
hooks could introduce large system overhead and heavily slow
down apps. Hence, another important motivation is that we
want to optimize the naive hook placement. And we intend
to systematically put hooks and automate the manual part of
hook placement in the Android Framework for each owner.
IV. DEFINITIONS
Since context-aware privacy protection is not only related
to apps and users, but also related to the Android Framework
code and hardware sensors, the proposed solution needs to see
a bigger picture. To help present the bigger picture clearly, we
give all the key definitions involved in the proposed solution.
Sensor Resource: From a user’s perspective, a sensor re-
source is one kind of sensor that may infer the user’s surround-
ing physical environment or user activities on a smartphone.
For instance, the camera is capable of inferring the user’s
surrounding physical environment by taking a picture or
recording a video.
Sensor Data Storing Variable: From an Android Framework
developer’s perspective, a sensor data storing (SDS) variable
is a variable to store a piece of sensor data or a reference
to the data. For instance, notifyLocation is one kind of
SDS variable in the LocationManagerService, which is
a main part of the Android Framework, to store GPS data.
Context: We define a context by three aspects: the time
window aspect, the location aspect, and the system status
aspect. Here, the system status is meant to capture such
information as (a) the foreground app name; (b) category name
of the foreground app; and (c) the back stack which holds all
the alive activities. For instance, a top secret meeting context
may be represented by the information of the meeting start
and end times and the meeting hotel name.
Privacy Concern: A privacy concern is defined by a context,
a particular set of sensor resources and a particular context-
aware policy. For instance, “in the private meeting context,
disable GPS, camera, microphone” is a privacy concern.
Policy: A policy is a particular set of rules on how to deal
with a set of sensor resources in a particular context. For
instance, “disable camera in context X” is a simple rule that
requests system to forbid one sensor resource (i.e., camera).
Sensor Data Access Method: A sensor data access method
(SDAM) is a function in the Android Framework that can
read data from or write data to a SDS variable. For instance,
getLastLocation in LocationManagerService
will provide a GPS data to a user app.
Sensor Control Method: A sensor control method (SCM)
is a function in the Android Framework that can send a
control command or call an operation interface. For in-
stance, scan in WifiNative starts to scan available wifi
network by sending “scan” command (to the NIC card).
takePicture in CameraClient lets the camera perform
the “take picture” operation by calling takePicture in
CameraHardwareInterface.
V. ENFORCING CONTEXT-AWARE PRIVACY POLICY
A. Approach Overview
Figure 2 shows the overview of our approach. We develop
a portal app to obtain the information about a user’s privacy
concerns in the User Privacy Preference Table (UPPT) through
the three standard steps: (1) The portal app will show a
list of sensor resources to a user, and let him choose what
sensor resources need to be protected. In step 2 and 3, for the
resources not selected by a user, options related to them will
not be shown again. (2) For each selected resource, the app
shows a list of control measures that a user intends to enforce.
(3) For each control measure, the app will request a user to
choose in which context the control should be enforced. Our
portal app generates a specific UPPT for a specific user.
Given a specific UPPT, Prihook will pick out the SDAMs
and SCMs that are specific to the UPPT from the Potential
Method Set which intends to be the union of all the individual-
privacy-concern-specific (sensitive) method sets. (In Section
V-G, we will describe how this set is obtained.) It automat-
ically generates hooks and instruments the selected SDAMs
and SCMs in the Android Framework.
Finally, the mobile phone manufacturer can update a instru-
mented Framework image to the owner’s smartphone through
online system update [23], [24].
B. User Privacy Preference Table
Generally, there may be thousands of different kinds of
user privacy concerns in the world. In this paper, we are
aimed to address context-aware privacy concerns rather than
arbitrary concerns. Our UPPT can represent all policies in
previous works on context-aware user privacy in the Android
Framework [10], [13], [16], [17], [21], [22], [25]. When
designing UPPT, we try to make a trade-off between user
friendliness and expressiveness by two principles:
Good coverage for users’ privacy requirements. Although
it is hard to design a table that can satisfy all people’s needs,
recent researches [26], [27] show that a small set of privacy
profiles can simplify most people’s privacy decisions, which
provides a promise to design such a table. A privacy profile
works as a policy table which contains typical user-predefined
rules on how an app can access a resource. The schema of
UPPT is determined by a survey of many users’ privacy deci-
sions on their devices. We analyse all previous works’ profiles
[26]–[33], summarize context-aware concerns on sensors, and
design UPPT to cover them. Although we cannot guarantee
that all people are satisfied with this particular set of privacy
concerns, it can work well if one’s concerns are involved in
our summary of previous works’ profiles.
Easy to use. We do not assume that a user has any
background knowledge about mobile security. Hence, the
items a user need to choose from the portal app should not
be lengthy and cumbersome. Specifically, the UPPT schema
only consists of five kinds of information, that is, system
status, time, location, resource and control measure. Figure 3
shows all possible options currently implemented in Prihook.
Fig. 2: Approach overview
Fig. 3: All possible options currently implemented
Fig. 4: A UPPT capturing a user’s privacy concerns
Compared to existing UI of Android permissions (showing a
list of technical permissions) during the app installation, our
portal UI is simpler and consists of less technical terms. Figure
4 shows an example UPPT after a user has chosen items in
the portal UI through the 3 standard steps. Words (designed by
us) that can be chosen by a user are limited and all of them
construct the UPPT lexicon. Although our UPPT policy is
designed by some previous works’ profiles, it can be extended
to support more policy such as location-aware policy [34]–
[46]. For instance, we can extend our “accuracy” to support
not only obfuscating but also subsampling and mixing [47].
C. Constructing the Mapping
In order to select the SDAMs and SCMs that are specific
to a particular UPPT from the Potential Method Set (PMS),
we need to build a mapping from methods in PMS to words
in the UPPT lexicon.
Challenges. One main challenge in building the mapping
from the rows in a UPPT to the PMS is that there is a large
semantic gap between them. The information (e.g., policies)
in UPPT cannot directly help us select methods from PMS
for hook placement because policy lexicon usually does not
contain any method names in the Android Framework. The
policy lexicon must be user-readable so that users can fill out
the UPPT. However, many if not most method names in PMS
are not really user-readable. Hence, policy lexicon will not
contain method names unless we stop letting users fill out
UPPT. Meanwhile, it is unrealistic to assume there is a security
analyst or engineer who is able to directly map the UPPT to
methods in Layer 3. Such a direct mapping requires too much
detailed knowledge about methods in Layer 3 and the program
logic in these methods. For instance, an engineer knows a
user app can get GPS data through ILocationManager
in LocationManagerService and thus maps method
getlastlocation. However, he may lack detailed knowl-
edge about IBlueTooth in Bluetooth and thus cannot
map method startDiscovery.
Operation abstraction layer. As shown in Figure 5, to
address this challenge, our key idea is to break the mapping
(from Lay 1 to Layer 3) into two mappings by introducing
the Operation Abstract Layer (OAL) as Layer 2. The first
mapping is from “resource control-measure” words in the
UPPT lexicon (Layer 1) to abstract operations in OAL (Layer
2). The second mapping is from abstract operation in OAL
(Layer 2) to methods in PMS (Layer 3). These two mappings
have different properties. The first one is mostly to deal with
user privacy policy and to figure out what is a sensitive
operation. The second one is only focused on analyzing the
source code of the Android Framework. And we can bring
in automation here. The OAL brings two advantages: First,
compared to the direct mapping, building a mapping from
Layer 1 to Layer 2 (the first mapping) does not require detailed
knowledge about methods in Layer 3. Second, When an expert
(or engineer) makes a mapping, the initial large semantic gap
is replaced by two smaller ones. In Section VI, our evaluation
shows that the OAL reduces the chance of making mistakes.
We recruit about 100 engineers to implement the first mapping.
This mapping is important because if we intend to implement
a control measure on a resource, our first thought is often to
look for the sensitive operations that may result in undesired
access to such resource. We can place hooks in related methods
to prevent such access. With the first mapping, we are able to
conceptually identify such sensitive operations.
Operation Abstract Layer (OAL) brings a new notion
abstract operation. For methods in PMS, we observe that
sensitive operations can be divided into three catogories: (a)
reading/write a SDS variable, which changes sensor data value
in a system service; (b) receiving/sending a SDS variable
through Inter-Process Communication (IPC), which may leak
sensor data to a user app; (c) directly calling interfaces
provided by hardware module or indirectly calling them by
sending commands, which changes the status of a sensor
Fig. 5: The overview of our mapping
hardware or leads to a hardware action (e.g., camera focusing).
We find that we are able to identify the abstract, high-level
semantics of these sensitive operations. We call these high-
level semantics/words abstract operation. For example, “re-
turn GPS” is such an abstract operation which means sending
GPS data to a user app. It corresponds to two sensitive methods
(i.e., getlastlocation,handleLocationChanged).
All abstract operations construct the OAL. Identifying the ab-
stract operations is currently a manual procedure. We use our
knowledge about the Android Framework (i.e., the knowledge
about the work flow of each system service and how each
sensor works) to identify about 70 abstract operations on sen-
sor resources. For example, there are 4 abstract operations on
GPS. In order to prevent undesired access, sensitive methods
which perform these operations may be hooked.
Layer 1 to layer 2 mapping. We build the first mapping
with three steps: (a) We write an explanatory note for each
abstract operation, and recruit 100 Android engineers to take
2 days to finish a series of mapping tasks. (b) For each map-
ping task, every engineer separately identifies what abstract
operations should be involved when he intends to implement
specific control measures on a specific sensor resource and
marks a confidence level (the score ranges from 20 to 100).
(c) We do not take identification result into acount unless it is
made with a confidence score of 80 or higher. We discuss
the result and build a mapping only when more than half
number of identifications are all agreed that operation should
be involved. The engineers we recruited have at least 2 years
experience in Android security development (e.g., Android
app security or SEAndroid), which makes them qualified to
implement the first mapping. Figure 6 shows an example task
an app developer identifies operations such as “start GPS” and
“return GPS” when he wants to disable GPS.
Layer 2 to layer 3 mapping.We build the Layer 2 to Layer
3 mapping through a unique human-in-loop iterative process.
The objective is to bring two desired results closer to discovery
with each iteration. The two desired results are (1) a “bucket”
of methods (SDAMs or SCMs) for each abstract operation,
and (2) a set of keywords for each abstract operation.
Before the iterative process starts, we initialize the two
desired results as follows: we assign an empty bucket to each
abstract operation; we recruit Android engineers to identify
a tentative set of keywords for each abstract operation. We
leverage the locality property to make this task manageable
Fig. 6: A mapping task for GPS
for the recruited engineers. In particular, given an abstract
operation, the locality property ensures that an engineer only
needs to be concerned with a particular system service and a
subset of methods in PMS.
After the iterative process starts, the workflow of each
iteration is as follows: (Step 1) it runs Algorithm 1 to statically
analyze the source code of each method in PMS for the
purpose of checking whether a keyword in desired result
#2 appears in any methods; (Step 2) it uses the findings
obtained in Step 1 to regenerate a bucket of methods for each
abstract operation through keyword lookup; (Step 3) it asks the
recruited engineers to examine the methods inside each bucket,
spot misplaced methods, and used the misplaced method as a
“clue” to refine desired result #2.
At the end of each iteration, both of the two desired results
usually get closer to discovery (of ground truth). The whole
iterative process will end when a new iteration does not result
in any changes to either of the two desired results.
As mentioned, the second mapping is only to analyze the
source code of the Android Framework, so we intend to semi-
automate the procedure through some keywords rather than
pure manual efforts. Algorithm 1 shows our static analysis.
It takes three inputs: modules containing source code of
SDAMs and SCMs, a set of names of SDAMs and SCMs,
an abstract operation list (AO list). And it extracts sub call-
graph from the whole call-graph of the Android Framework
in a bottom-up way. It analyzes a method after all its callees
have been analyzed. Overall, Algorithm 1 firstly identifies
relevant keywords from each method in PMS. Then, it uses
keyword lookup (against desired result #2) to obtain a subset
of abstract operations. Such a subset indicates the abstract
operations which the method being analyzed may perform.
The GATHER_KEYWORDS in Algorithm 1 is used to gather
keywords in a SDAM (or SCM). It scans the source code of
a method and searches for keywords in it.
Figure 7 shows a portion of desired result #2 used in
Algorithm 1, with abstract operations on the left side and
keywords on the right. These keywords are extracted from se-
mantic information in source code of methods in PMS. Unlike
semantics in Linux kernel, most of which are manipulations of
kernel data structure (e.g., inode and task struct), semantics in
the Android Framework are more diverse and comprehensive.
Algorithm 1: Static Analysis on Methods
Input: (1):M :Modules contain source code of SDAMs and SCMs, (2):N :A set
of names of SDAMs and SCMs,(3):Ao: An abstract operation list
Output: For each n in N, a set of abstract operations in OAL
1 Construct the call graph G of the module M
2 L:= the list of vertices of G
3 foreach f ∈ L do
4 S := GATHER KEYWORDS(f);
5 foreach g such that f calls g do
6 if g ∈ PMS then
7 S := S ∪ Keywords(g)
8 Keywords(f) := S
9 SOPS := LOOKUP ABSTRACT OPERATION(S, Ao)
10 Result(f) := SOPS
11 return Result(f);
Fig. 7: A portion of keywords for abstract operations
Based on our observations of the iterative process, we find we
can use 4 kinds of semantic information as our keywords: (1)
data type of a SDS variable; (2) an IPC interface between
user apps and a system service; (3) an interface provided
by a hardware module; (4) a macro definition or constant
string which indicates a command for hardware modules. By
our human-in-loop iterative process, it takes us two weeks to
obtain about 200 keywords in desired result #2.
D. Selecting Methods from the PMS
Given a user-provided UPPT, Prihook firstly extracts “re-
source control-measure” words in it. Then, it directly selects
a set of specific methods #TM through searching the mapping
in Figure 5. Prihook leverages the set #TM to extract a sub
call-graph of the Android Framework. Then, for each abstract
operation in each call chain, Prihook checks whether there
exists two or more methods that perform a same abstract
operation. If it does, Prihook only picks the deepest method
and removes others for that abstract operation. After the “pick-
and-remove”, each abstract operation in each call chain has
only one corresponding method. All construct the final hooked
method set #FM.
E. Generating Hooks for Selected Methods
Listing 2: Hook template
1 // check policy
2 String allowed level = mContextAwarePolicyService.checkPolicy(
notifyLocation , Binder . getCallingPid () , Binder . getCallingUid
() ) ;
3 if ( allowed level == ”DISALLOW”){
4 return null ;
5 }else if ( allowed level == ”OBFUSCATE”){
6 // control data accuracy
7 notifyLocation = mContextAwarePolicyService.obfuscate (
notifyLocation ) ;
8 }
Prihook uses a hook template to generate hooks for
selected methods. The List 2 shows an example of a
generated hook in handleLocationChangedLocked in
LocationManagerService. It is a typical if-else code
style. The hook generated by Prihook is able to check policy
for a resource (Line 2) or control the accuracy of a resource
that a user app can obtain (Line 7).
F. Placing Hooks
Placing hooks is straightforward. For each selected method,
Prihook places hooks at the first line in it.
G. Discovering a PMS in the Android Framework
Our goal is to discover a method set from which Prihook
can select a particular subset to put hooks. In order to avoid
“the bypass” mistake, it intends to be the union of all the
individual-privacy-concern-specific (sensitive) method sets.
One traditional way is a manual inspection of the Android
Framework. With a detailed understanding of the Android
Framework code base, we can obtain a set of hand-picked
SDAMs and SCMs. However, considering the large body of
the Android Framework (e.g., 384,296 methods in Android
6.0), the hand-picked approach is impractical and error-prone.
Another possible way is to use the dynamic taint tracking
technique. However, we cannot use this technique due to two
reasons. First, a SCM cannot be discovered by dynamic taint
tracking techniques. A SCM is a method which can send
a control command. It does not contain any SDS variable.
Hence, we cannot discover these methods by tainting SDS
variables. Second, user privacy highly rely on Android native
services, which are implemented in C++. For instance, a user
app can obtain onboard sensor data and pictures directly from
native services (e.g., SensorService, CameraService)
and infer user privacy. However, dynamic taint analysis tool-
s/techniques like TaintDroid [48], TaintART [49] and NDroid
[50] can only help us monitor how sensor data flow through
Android Java services and JNI runtime libs during execution.
A native service runs as a Linux process and can be executed
directly without the interpretation of Android Java virtual
machine (i.e., Dalvik or ART). Hence, tools such as TaintDroid
fail to analyze native services. While TEMU [51] is able to do
dynamic taint analysis on binary code, it requires a laborious
and tedious manual inspection of the Android Framework to
find all possible source and sink. How to automate such
finding process is non-trival.
Further, our problem of finding SDAMs is essentially data
dependent and needs a backward taint analysis. The existing
static analysis techniques are not feasible to solve this problem
due to the following reasons:
First, the data dependence requires us to focus on methods
that read/write a SDS variable. A static analysis using control
flow graph (CFG) does not contain such information.
Second, compared to dynamic taint analysis, the accuracy of
static taint analysis is much lower. It suffers a huge number
of false positives especially in the case of static backward
taint analysis, which only knows sink and needs to find
all source. To achieve a high accuracy analysis, we need
a precise modeling of the runtime execution for the Android
Framework (consisting of Java and C++ code). However, how
to build such a runtime model for precise static taint-analysis
is still an open problem for the community. Although machine
learning used by Prihook does not guarantee to identify every
SDAM and SCM, it is a practical best-effort solution for this
problem. In cross-validation, our machine learning achieves a
precision of over 96%, which means that the PMS generated
by our approach greatly reduces the risk of missing sensitive
methods for hook placement.
Third, besides the risk of being imprecise, the existing tools
such as FlowDroid [52] and IFDS [53], [54] have been beset
with several problems. When leveraging FlowDroid to do the
static taint-analysis, we meet a problem of missing source.
For instance, updating the current GPS location to a system
service does not need a meaningful source as defined by
FlowDroid. [55] has shown that even in the case of marking
all methods in a lib as source, the forward taint analysis for
that specific lib is not scalable. We believe it also cannot be
scalable for the Android Framework if we mark all methods
in it as source. IFDS is not designed for the Android
Framework and is not trivial to be ported.
Hence, we decide to leverage machine learning to discover
SDAMs and SCMs in both Java and C++. It is an automated
and scalable approach and keeps a good correctness (e.g.,
about an average precision of 96%). Specifically, we leverage
support vector machine (SVM) to discover such a method set
by classifying methods into two categories: SDAM&SCM and
the others.
Our approach.We group Framework methods into 2 parts:
the first group is a training data set which we manually
annotate from Framework code, the second group is a test
set that we do not know whether a method is a SDAM
(or SCM) or not. We use supervised learning to train a
classifier on a relatively small subset of manually-annotated
training examples. The training set is much smaller than the
test set (i.e., about 0.8% in our case). We build a feature
database for our classification (see Feature selection shortly).
3 students manually annotated 1000 methods from the Android
Framework as a training set and abstract features from them
to identify SDAMs and SCMs. We use Sequential Minimal
Optimization (SMO) implementation in RStadio with a radial
kernel to realize our classifier.
Feature selection. We use 143 semantic features to classify
methods in the Android Framework. Our evaluation shows that
a combination of all features can provide enough information
for classifying. We group them into 4 major categories:
Class Name A method in a specific class contains a specific
string like “location” and “machine”. Many service classes
handling sensor data contain an explicit name of a sensor (e.g.,
LocationManagerService).
Method Name The name of a method contains or
starts with a specific string like “camera”, “callback” and
“start”. Many SDAMs directly contain an explicit name
of a sensor, such as getCameraInfo, which can be
used to infer an access method. Callback functions (e.g.,
callbackFaceDetection) are widely applied to handle
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sensor data, which can be used to infer a method.
Parameter Name Parameters of a method contain a specific
string like “buffer”, “event”. Many parameters are organized
in a specific data structure (e.g., sensors_event_t).
Return Value Type Return value type of a method contains a
specific string like “void”. SDAMs and SCMs normally do not
return a void value, which helps us exclude parts of methods.
The reason for why these features work is that the source
code in the Android framework often follows a certain regular
coding style or contains duplicated parts of one method’s
implementation when implementing another, which leads to
a certain degree of regularity and redundancy. A machine
learning approach like ours can discover and learn it.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Constructing Six Representative UPPTs
Prihook leverages user privacy concerns to optimize hook
placement. In order to do a series of evaluation, we should
firstly construct a set of typical UPPTs as our evalua-
tion foundation. We recruit six volunteers whose profes-
sions are different and let them fill their UPPTs. Con-
sidering the page limit, the appendix only shows two of
them. Prihook separately instruments six Android Framework
based on six UPPTs. And we add a system service named
ContextAwarePolicyService in each new code base
and flush six different Android images separately for each
volunteer’s phone. The system service in each image can check
policy and do data obfuscation.
B. Privacy Protection
To evaluate the defense effectiveness of Prihook against pri-
vacy leaks, we construct a malicious app which is authorized
with all permissions. It is capable to obtain sensitive resources
by (a) calling SDK APIs with a complete permissions list;
(b) using Java reflection to access hidden API methods;
(c) directly communicating with services. We summarize all
sensitive resources from 6 UPPTs. For each resource, we let 6
volunteers separately use their phones under specific context
defined by their UPPTs. Then, our malicious app leverages
the three ways separately to obtain sensitive resources under
the specific context. As shown in Figure 8, our result shows
that Prihook can prevent attackers from obtaining a sensor
resource if it is not allowed in the UPPT. For instance, the
malicious app cannot obtain the audio data as there is a privacy
concern about microphone in Figure 10.
TABLE II: The number of SDAMs and SCMs discovered in the Android Framework
Android version Framework Methods Package Methods Total Methods Total SDAMs and SCMs SDAMs and SCMs in system services and apps
Android-4.2.2 r1 82627 39912 122539 1260 1146
Android-5.1.1 r14 285413 71980 357393 2491 2156
Android-6.0.1 r1 302610 81686 384296 2927 2670
C. Impacts on User Apps
In order to test if our hooks cause crash or slowdown
of user apps, we use the Android automated testing tool
MonkeyRunner to download 150 user apps from the Android
Market. For each UPPT, we use MonkeyRunner to install and
run these 150 user apps. These apps includes financial apps
(e.g, bank apps), taxi apps, sports apps and music apps. Almost
all these apps need some sensors such as GPS and bluetooth
to function correctly. We design touch events to emulate user
activities on each app and test whether it will crash and how
much time it costs a user app to get sensor data. The cost time
refers to the duration from the time when a documented SDK
API is called, to the time when a user app gets the data.
Table III shows how much time it costs a user app to
get sensor data on top 8 apps with the payment-sensitive
UPPT. For each sensor data allowed by UPPT, a mount
of delay (about several milliseconds) may happen. This is
because a SDK API (e.g., getLastLocation) often results
in invoking several hooks. On average, the time of checking
policy and data obfuscation (i.e., randomizing data in our
implementation) in each hook is less than two millisecond
on Nexus 5, which is negligible. There is a Denial of Service
(DOS) for a map app on onboard sensor resources when our
hooks execute payment-sensitive UPPT policies that disable
onboard sensors. However, this DOS is caused by user policies
rather than by inappropriate hooks because policies disallow
such an access. It seems that the app relies on onboard sensor
data to provide smartphone’s moving direction. If the data
access is disabled, it cannot function well. We also test a
location-sensitive UPPT and find some gaming apps work
improperly. This is because these apps heavily rely on the
real-time data to determine user movements. We also evaluate
the number of hooks for each UPPT in Table V.
D. Precision and Recall of Machine Learning
We expect the machine learning can discover a potential
method set of SDAMs and SCMs. This approach can make
sense only if it keeps a very high precision of discovering
methods that are related to sensor resources. One approach
to confirm this is to manually identify the correct set of all
SDAMs and SCMs in the Android Framework and compare it
with the result list generated by Prihook. However, the code
base of the Android Framework is really large which makes
this approach impractical. Hence, with our best-effort, we take
the cross validation to access such effectiveness.
We apply a standard approach of a ten-fold cross valida-
tion. Specifically, we randomly pick 5100 methods from the
Android Framework, annotate and use them both as training
and tests data set. The validation process works as follows:
The hand-annotated mehotds will be randomly divided into ten
equally-sized groups. We train the machine learning classifier
on nine of them and classify the remaining one. The whole
approach will be repeated ten times. We calculate the average
precision and recall about our classifier. We do the cross
validation on 3 different Android versions. Table IV shows
the final results. Since the test data set is randomly picked, the
precision and recall should carry over to the entire Android
Framework with high probability. Some helper functions such
as load_audio_interface are misclassified as SDAMs
by Prihook. Such a method helps AudioFlinger load
hardware module and does not contain any SDS variable.
Besides, we find that Prihook may leak some SDAMs such
as updateLinkProperties. However, we think such a
mistake will not lead to a privacy violation because Pri-
hook discovered the method addressUpdated which calls
updateLinkProperties. In other words, they are in a
same call chain. We think this mistake happened because these
two method names do not provide enough code redundancy
that Prihook can use. However, after adding some new fea-
tures to our machine learning, Prihook can find such a case.
Except for SVM, we test other classification algorithms
which fall short of discovering the PMS. We find that SVM
significantly outperforms Naive Bayes [56] on discovering
SDAMs. The possible reason could be the violation of the
Bayes assumption about the conditional independence of the
feature sets. The pruned C4.5 decision tree [57] gets a preci-
sion and recall of about 70%. We think that the main problem
with a rule set is its lack of flexibility. A rule tree would
often include a rule mapping all set methods to SDAMs.
However, some SDAMs do not start with set. Besides, not
all methods that start with set are actually SDAMs. With an
SVM, such aspects that are usually correct, but not always,
can be expressed more appropriately by shifting the hyper-
plane used for separation. Besides, we also try to use semi-
supervised learning to train a classifier such as co-training [58]
with xgboost [59], which does not get an accuracy as high as
SVM.
E. Application across Android Versions
To test how well it performs for different Android ver-
sions, we use machine learning to discover the PMS for 3
Android versions. As shown in Table II, our classifier detects
the changes in different API versions well. It reliably finds
new SDAMs and SCMs which changes a little bit (e.g.,
startscan in Android 5.0 and startDelayedScan
in Android 6.0). It is worth noting that for some com-
pletely new and previously unanticipated methods (e.g.,
updateMonitoring in Receiver in Android 5.0 or
newer versions), Prihook is able to discover them.
TABLE III: Elapsed time for the user app to get sensor data on the payment-sensitive UPPT without/with Prihook.
User apps
GPS Camera Onboard sensors Wifi Audio (mic) Bluetooth
Without Prihook With Prihook Without Prihook With Prihook Without Prihook With Prihook Without Prihook With Prihook Without Prihook With Prihook Without Prihook With Prihook
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
Financial App A 3143 3156 6028 6042 2565 forbidden 5458 5472 not used not used not used not used
Financial App B 2990 3002 6160 6173 2513 forbidden 5432 5464 not used not used not used not used
Texi App 4202 4218 not used not used 1890 forbidden 5130 5155 6552 6565 not used not used
Video App 3075 3088 8441 8465 not used forbidden 5601 5614 not used not used not used not used
Social App A 3098 3112 7348 7361 1918 forbidden 5221 5052 6069 6620 not used not used
Music App B 2524 2543 not used not used 2321 forbidden 5014 5031 not used not used 9342 9357
Map App A 2982 3003 not used not used 2037 forbidden 5102 5123 6231 6255 not used not used
Gaming App A 3122 3136 not used not used 2611 forbidden 5002 5026 not used not used not used not used
TABLE IV: Precision and recall of our machine learning
Android version Precision Recall
Android-4.2.2 r1 0.9688 0.932
Android-5.1.1 r14 0.9705 0.945
Android-6.0.1 r1 0.9656 0.927TABLE V: The number of hooks placed by each user’s UPPT
on Android 4.2.2
UPPT The number of hooks
Location-sensitive 47
Location&onboardsensor-sensitive 81
Location&payment-sensitive 58
Calling-sensitive 23
Payment-sensitive 19
Location&wifi-sensitive 92
VII. RELATED WORK
Privacy Protection There are many solutions to enhance
Android with context-aware hooks [10], [13], [16], [17], [21],
[22], [25]. SmarPer [11] and CRePE [12] address common
user privacy concerns through hook placement. They start from
permission-checks to place hooks. However, as mentioned in
Section I, for context-aware privacy protection, adding hooks
in permission-checks is not a good choice. Protect My Privacy
(PMP) [17] lets users deny or fake access to their private data
from any app or any 3rd party library based on Xposed Frame-
work. PMP does not clearly claim where it starts from for
hook placement. It involves 8 hooked methods which include
requestLocationUpdates. However, adding hooks in
this method can lead to “no-isolation” mistakes, because its
instance runs in a user app process. To the best of our
knowledge, Prihook is the first work to place hooks based
on specific context-aware user privacy concerns. Compared to
the existing works, its hook placement is personalized.
Another related work is the research of the permission
mapping, that is, a mapping between an API call and a
permission that a user app must be authorized. PScout [60]
uses static reachability analysis for permission-check APIs
and creates a permission mapping. This mapping can be
used to do permission analysis [61], compartmentalize third-
party code [62] and study developer behaviors [63]. Unlike
Pscout, Revisiting [64] uses object-sensitive pointer resolution
to generate a more precise call-graph on its static runtime
model. Kratos [65] is focused on identifying inconsistency on
Android permission system by forward analysis.
Besides, to detect or prevent private data leakage, many
researchers use static or dynamic taint tracking techniques on
the Android Framework to obtain information flow. Epicc [66]
creates specifications for each inter-component communica-
tion (ICC) source and sink. FlowDroid [52] generates per-
component lifecycle models so that it can help understand
when, how, and what data travels through the Android Frame-
work. AndroidLeaks [67] and DroidSafe [68] also work for
the same purpose. TaintDroid [48] customizes dalvik virtual
machine to achieve taint storage and taint propagation so that
it can track information flows of sensitive data. TaintART [49]
is similar to TaintDroid, but it is mainly focused on Android
Art runtime machine. NDroid [50] uses dynamic taint tracking
to analyze the Android JNI information flow. BlueSeal [69]
is an extension to the Android permission mechanism that
characterizes the implicit interactions between data and APIs
protected by standard permissions.
Automated Hook Placement TAHOE [70] provides a
technique to automate the hook placement in Linux kernel.
They manually identify a set of idioms of security sensitive
operation. With this information, they use static analysis to
summarize the operations that hooks protect and the operations
that a Linux module performs. Then, placing hooks is to match
operations in the Linux module with hooks that mediate the
operations. [71] presents an automated hooking tool that can
be used to put authorized hooks for X server and postgresql.
They leverage the user input requests to statically analyze the
server source code. It can automatically group accesses of
structure members into operations and put hooks on them.
The above two works do not start from specific context-aware
user privacy concerns for hook placement. However, the hook
placement in Prihook is personalized.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an automated solution named
Prihook for hook placement in the Android Framework. Based
on a specific UPPT, Prihook can select methods from the
PMS, generate and put hooks for the selected methods.
IX. APPENDIX
Fig. 9: The payment-sensitive UPPT filled by a high school
student
Fig. 10: The location&wifi-sensitive UPPT filled by a busi-
nessman
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